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F. No. 19120.

In Bank.

Feb. 21, 1955.]

CHARLES K. SPARKS et al., Respondents, v. JOHN
AUGUST REDINGER et al., Appellants.
[ S. P. No. 19119.

In Bank.

Feb. 21, 19.55.]

GARTH S. THOMAS, Respondent, v. JOHN AUGUST
REDINGER et al., Appellants.
[1] New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions.-Where trial court
grants new trial on ground of error in instructions, its conclusion, in exercise of wide discretion, will not ordinarily be
disturbed.
[2] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New TriaLOn appeal from order granting new trial, all presumptions are
in favor of order as against verdict, and order will be affirmed
if it may be sustained on any reasonable view of record.
[3] New Trial-Errors in Law.-Trial court is expressly enjoined
by Const., art. VI, § 4lh, from granting new trial for error
of law unless such error is prejudicial, and if it clearly appears
that error could not have affected result of trial, court is bound
to deny motion.
[ 4a, 4b] Automobiles-Appeal- Harmless Error- InstructionsLast Clear Chance.-In action for personal injuries arising
from collision when automobile made left turn into path of
tractor, wherein tractor owner cross-complained against automobile driver and jury was instructed to bring in verdict for
tractor owner if it found that automobile driver was negligent
in operation of automobile, that such negligence proximately
contributed to damages sustained by tractor owner, and that
tractor driver was free from negligence in operation of his
Yehicle, failure to give last clear chance instruction did not
constitute prejudicial error where jury found that tractor
driver was not guilty of any negligence proximately contributing to accident, since last clear chance doctrine presupposes
negligence on part of both parties.
[5] Negligence-Last Clear Chance.-Last clear chance doctrine
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 92 et seq.; Am.Jur., New Trial,
§ 117 et seq.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 80 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 215 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] New Trial, § 124; [2] Appeal and
Error, §1197; [3] New Trial, §117; [4] Automobiles, §385-10;
[5-7] Negligence, § 46.
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proximately contributes to happening of accident.

APPEAI-'S from orders of tlw Superior Court of Alameda
County granting new trials. Thomas J. Ledwich, Judge.
Reversed.
Actions for damages for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of collision of vehicles. Orders granting
plaintiffs new trials, reversed.
Keith, Creede & Sedgwick, Cresswell & Davis and Scott
Conley for Appellants.
,James G. Quinn, Jr., William H. Quinn and Cyril Viadro
for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs were injured in a collision when
their automobile, while making a left-hand turn at a highway
intersection, was struck by an oncoming tractor, pulling two
gravel-loaded trailers. Plaintiffs brought actions against
Homen, owner of the tractor, and his employee, Redinger,
the driver. Homen cross-complained against the plaintiff
driver of the automobile, Charles K. Sparks, for damages to
his equipment. All actions were consolidated for trial. The
jury returned Yerdicts against all three plaintiffs on their
complaints and a verdirt in favor of Homen ou his crosscomplaint. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial. 'l'he court
granted their motions on the sole ground that it had erred
in failing· to give plaintiffs' propose(1 instruction on the doc-
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a new
a new trial on the ground
in the exercise of
be disturbed. (Hunton
Portland Cement
50 Cal.App.2d 684, 69:)
\123 P.2d 947] Barnett
93 Cal.App.2d 553, 557
!209 P.2d
. ) [2] All presumptions favor the order as
the verdict
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25
Cal.2c! 165, 169 [153 P.2d 338]), and the order will be affirmed
if it ma~· br :mstaim;d on any rcascmable view of the record.
(Ballar-'cl v.
28 Cal.2d 357, 358 [170
.)
But the trial court, no less than the
is expressly enjoined by article- VI, section
of onr Constitution from granting a new trial for error
of law unlrss such error is prejudicial. If it clearly appear.,;
that the error could not have affected the result of the trial,
the court is bound to deny the motion. (Brown v. George
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 262 [143 P.2d 929] .)
[4a.] Here the record affirmatively shows that the failure
to give the proposed last clear ehancc instruction did not
eonstitute prejudicial error, and that the trial court erred in
so holding. Accordingly, the orders granting plaintiffs a
new trial must be reversed.
For thr purpose of this discussion, it will be assumed that
there was sufficient evidence relating to the happening of the
accident to have warranted the giving of a last clear chance
instruction. (Daniels v. City & County of San Franc·isco,
40 Cal.2d 614, 623 [255 P.2d 785]; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit
Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 633 [255 P.2d 795] .) Apart from the
failure of the court to instruct on this doctrine, no complaint
is made of any of thr instructions. The jury was otherwise
proprrly instructed on negligence, contributory negligence,
and proximate eause.
The same main issues >vere presented by the pleadings with
respeet to plaintiffs' complaints and defendant Homen's crosscomplaint. Under the instructions given, the jury could
only have returned a verdict in favor of Homen on his crosscomplaint in the e\'rllt that it found that Redinger, the driver
of Homen's tractor, \vas not guilty of any negligence which
proximately eontributrd to the happening of the accident.
'rhus, the jury was expressly instructed: ''If you find that
the cross-defendant Charles Sparks was negligent in the operation of his automobile and that such negligence proximately
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<:outributed to the damages sustained by the cross-complainant
Homen, and that the defendant John Hedinger was free from
any negligence in the operation of the truck owned by crosscomplainant Homen, then you must find a verdict in favor
of cross-complainant Homen. However, any negligence on
the part of cross-complainant's employee, John Redinger,
which proximately contributed to the accident in question will
bar a recovery for the cross-complainant."
In view of these instructions and the jury's verdict in favor
of Homen on the cross-complaint, it necessarily follows that
the failure to give the last clear chance instruction did not
prejudice plaintiffs' cause, for the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of both parties. (19 Cal.Jur., Negligence,
§ 80, pp. 651-652.) Accordingly, when the jury, as here,
necessarily found that the defendant driver was not guilty
of any negligence proximately contributing to the accident,
there was no place for the jury's application of the last clear
chance principles.
Plaintiffs argue that negligence "may consist of the failure
to avoid an accident under the last clear chance doctrine";
and where the jury is not instructed on that subject in a
proper case, it might find a party free from negligence, but
if it were instructed on the subject it might find the same
party guilty of negligence in that he had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident and failed to exercise ordinary care
to do so. [5] However, plaintiffs' argument is based upon
the erroneous theory that the last clear chance doctrine
changes the rules for the determination of the issue of negligence on the part of the respective parties. Such is not the
case, as those rules remain precisely the same; and in order
to impose liability upon a party under the last clear chance
doctrine, the jury must find not only that such party was
guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the happening of the accident, but must also find that all other necessary
elements of the last clear chance doctrine were present.
[6] The only purpose of the last clear chance doctrine is
to relieve the injured party from the rigid application of
the rule that contributory negligence will bar his recovery,
when the circumstances are such that it may be said that such
party's negligence is a remote, rather than a proximate, cause
of his injuries. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197,
201-204 [13 P.2d 915]; Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal.
205, 207-208 [13 P.2d 9181.) [7] In other words, the last
clear chance doctrine is but a "phase of the doctrine of
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proximate cause" in its relation to the negligence of the
injured party who seeks to invoke it. (See annos. : 92 .A.L.R.
47; 119 .A.L.R. 1041; 171 .A.L.R. 365.) It is therefore entirely
clear that the last clear chance doctrine can have no possible
application where it affirmatively appears that the party
sought to be charged is not guilty of any negligence which
proximately contributes to the happening of the accident.
[4b] The jury was fully instructed that plaintiffs were
entitled to a verdict if it should find that the defendant driver
was chargeable with any negligence in the operation of his
truck that proximately contributed to plaintiffs' injuries, and
that "contributory negligence is of no importance unless it
is a proximate cause of the accident." (See Gillette v. City
of San Francisco, 58 Oal..App.2d 434, 441 [136 P.2d 611] ;
Simon v. City & County of San Francisco, 79 Cal..App.2d 590,
600 [180 P .2d 393].) Moreover, the instructions were in
fact more stringent than even the last clear chance doctrine
in their application to the issue of Redinger's alleged negligence. 'rhey recited his duty to use ordinary care in the
face of another's negligence which ''in the exercise of ordinary
care would be apparent to him," while the last clear chance
instruction only applies in the event of actual knowledge of
another's perilous position. (Daniels v. City & County of
San Francisco, supm, 40 Oal.2d 614, 619; Sills v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630, 637.) In view of such
broad instructions and the jury's return of a verdict in favor
of the cross-complainant Homen, which only could be based
on a finding that Redinger was not guilty of any negligence
wl1ich proximately contributed to the accident, it is clear that
the giving of the last clear chance instruction could not have
changed the result, and the error, in failing to give it, was
not prejudicial.
The present situation, in which the verdict for the crosscomplainant Homen could only rest on a finding that his
driver Redinger was free from negligence proximately contributing to the accident, is distinguishable from the cases
cited by plaintiffs, where there was simply a verdict against
a plaintiff on his complaint. (Daniels v. City &: County of
San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614; Sills v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630.) In these cited cases
the reviewing court could not tell whether the verdict in
favor of defendant was based on a finding that defendant
'Was not negligent or that plaintiff was negligent, in which
latter event a last clear chance instruction might have avoided
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that factor as a proximate cause
recovery. Accordingly, in those cases, the failure to instruct on the doctrine
of last clear chance was deemed
In the present
case, there is no room for doubt as to the basis for the verdict, as the record
shows that it was necessarily
based on the
that defendant and cross-complainant Homen's driver was
gence
dent.
a new trial are reversed.
The orders
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds,
Schauer, J., concurred.

and

CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
This is another last clear chance case that adds to the
confusion in this field. The majority opinion erroneously
states that the doctrine presupposes negligence by both plaintiff and defendant and then holds that instructions on negligence gave the jury a clear picture of the circumstances under
which the jury could find defendant driver of the truck,
negligent under the last clear chance doctrine.
On the first proposition, the majority opinion states : ''. . .
the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of both
parties.'' And: ''Plaintiffs argue that negligence 'may consist of the failure to avoid an accident under the last clear
chance doctrine'; and where the
is not instructed on
that subject in a proper case, it might find a party free from
negligence, but if it were instructed on the subject it might
find the same party guilty of negligence in that he had the
last clear chance to avoid the accident and failed to exercise
ordinary care to do so. However,
is based
upon the erroneous theory that the last clear chance doctrine
changes the rules for the determination of the issue of negligence on the part of the respective parties. Such is not
the case, as those rules remain precisely the same; and in
order to impose liability upon a party under the last clear
chance doctrine, the jury must find not only that such party
was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the
happening of the accident, but must also find that all other
necessary elements of the last clear ehance doctrine were
present.''
It is not the law that under the doctrine of last clear
chance negligence of defendant is ''presupposed'' or that
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to do with formIt is well settled
a basis for defendant's
that under this doctrine there may have been no antecedent
on defendant's
His negligence may arise
solely from his conduct after a situation is presented in which
he must use care to avoid the accident, because he has the
last clear chance to do so, even though he was not negligent
to that time. Therefore the jury should be instructed
on the doctrine or its
to permit it to determine
whether defendant •vas negligent in the light of the situation confronting him. 'fhe question is ably discussed : ''But
last clear chance cases are not so simple; the difference between the m·iginal and the final negligence of the parties must
be taken into account. The plaintiff must be guilty of some
original negligence by which he places himself in a position
of danger; and the defendant, seeing plaintiff in such danger,
must be guilty of some final negligence which proximately
causes the injury. And if, at the last moment, either party
can avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, the
law then disregards his prior misconduct, and deals with his
behavior at the time the injury is done. In this event, the
prior misconduct is said to be the cause of the danger, and
the later misconduct the cause of the injury . . . .
"In last clear chance cases, the original negligence of the
injured party il1
himself into a position of peril, is
merely an attendant cond-ition, and not the proximate cause
of the injury, . . . and the final negligence of the defendant,
after discovering plaintiff in a position of danger, is a new
and independent negligence, and the proximate cause of
the injury.''
''Let us sketchily repeat those special conditions: first,
that the plaintiff has been guilty of original negligence of
some kind ; second, that by reason of such original negligence
he, the plaintiff, is in a position of danger; . . . fourth, that
the defendant then haR an opportunity to avoid injuring the
plaintiff, by exercising ordinary care under the circumstances;
and fifth, that the defendant fails to exercise such ordinary
care, or in other words, is guilty of some final negligence.
"That is to say, the defendant's duty under the last clear
chance doctrine, to exercise final care [emphasis added] to
avoid the accident, does not arise until he discovers plaintiff
in a position of danger . . . . But even if he was guilty of
original negligence, that fact alone will not make him liable
under the last clear chance doctrine; for just as plaintiff's
the•

128

SPARKS

1).

HEDINGER

[44 C.2cl

original negligence is merely an attendant condit·ion, and
not the proximate cause, of the injury, . . . so, on principle,
it would seem that defendant's original negligence should
likewise be considered an attendant condition, and not the
proximate cause, under the last clear chance doctrine. As
soon, however, as defendant discovers plaintiff in a position
of danger, he is then bound to exercise ordinary care to
avoid the accident; and if, under all the circumstances, he
does exercise such ordinary care, he is not liable; but if,
under all the circumstances, he fails to use ordinary care
from that time on, he may be held guilty of final negligence
[emphasis added], and the plaintiff may invoke the doctrine.
It then becomes the function of the court or jury to determine
whether or not, under all the circumstances, the defendant,
after discovering plaintiff in a position of danger, was guilty
of such final negligence [emphasis added]."
''One says that the antecedent negligence of one or both
parties is immaterial; that 'the law deals with their behavior
in the situation in which it finds them at the time the mischief
is done, regardless of their prior misconduct'; and that the
prior misconduct is the cause of the danger only, while it is
the later misconduct that is the cause of the injury." (Hall,
Last Clear Chance, pp. 4, 82, 212.)
While some of the older cases said that for the doctrine
to apply defendant's negligence is presupposed (see cases
collected 19 Cal.Jur. 651-652) other cases and recent ones
have pointed out that defendant's negligence, and hence liability, may arise from his conduct after the last clear chance
situation is presented to him, the proposition being stated in
the language that plaintiff's negligence is remote and the
proximate cause of the injury is defendant's negligence in
failing to avert the injury. It is stated in Doherty v. California Nav. & Imp. Co., 6 Cal.App. 131, 137 [91 P. 419],
quoting from Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada,
70 N.H. 607 [50 A. 103, 54 L.R.A. 955] : " 'If due care on
the part of either at the time of the injury would prevent
it, the antecedent negligence of one or both parties is immaterial except it may be as one of the circumstances by
which the requisite measure of care is to be determined. In
such a case the law deals with their behavior in the situation in which it finds them at the time the mischief is done,
regardless of their prior misconduct. The latter . . . is the
cause of the danger, the former is the cause of the injury.
' " In Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630,
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same."
[215
P .2d
himself
111 a
escape by
the exercise of
care, that defendant knew of the
boy's
that she had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident
the exercise
and that the
was killed as a
"
added.) 'I' his court said in (} irdncr v.
Union Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 200 [13 P.2d 915] : " . . . established the fact that when plaintiff
and was proceeding across the path of the oil truck, and up to the time
of the collision, he did not see and was totally oblivious of
the approach of the
and the
that confronted
him; that defendant Elam first saw plaintiff's car some forty
or fifty feet away from the intersection; that he saw plaintiff
looking straight ahead, in an opposite
and not
slowing the speed of his automobile; that Elam was traveling
at a speed of twenty miles an hour and could have stopped
his truck almost immediately, and within a distance of a few
feet; that he had ample time and sufficient distance, at least
twenty-five to thirty-five feet, in which to stop and avoid
coming in contact with plaintiff's car, but failed to do so."
'"rhe real issue in cases of the character here involved is not
whose negligence came first or last, but whose negligence,
however it came, was the proximate cause of the injury. . . .
''If defendant is not able to avoid injuring plaintiff in
the exercise of ordinary care, the plaintiff's original negligence continues to be the proximate cause of his own injury,
which bars recoYery. If, on the other hand, defendant is
able to avoid injuring the negligent plaintiff and negligently
fails to do so, plaintiff's origiual though
nc:gligence
only remotely contributes to the injury and is not the proximate cause thereof, and hence the applied doctrine, by its own
principles, establishes the right of plaintiff to recover notwithstanding the fact that his original negligence would, by
its continuing nature, bar a recovery if the doctrine were not
applicable." (Emphasis added; Girdner v. Um:on Oil Co.,
supra, pp. 201-202, 203.) Similarly in Center v. Yellow Cab
Co., 216 Cal. 205, 208 [13 P.2d 918], it was said: "If the
44 C.2d-5
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elements of the last (·lear cha11ce doctrine are
tiH' doctrine appli('N, the (•onl
injured is not the proximate cause, as the
led er, constitutes the sole proximate cause.''
(Emphasis added.) In Daniels v.
&;
San
]i'rancisco, 40 Cal.2d 614
P.2d
, and the Sills, Bonebrake, Girdner and Center cases there was no antecedent
negligence on defendant's part. The sole negligence with
respect to him was his conduct after being
with a
last clear chance situation.
The majority uses the fallacious premise above discussed
to conclude that since plaintiff lost on the cross-eomplaint, and
there were adequate instructions on the subject of defendant's
duty after he was confronted with the plaintiff's perilous
position, the failure to give an instruction on last clear
chance was not prejudicial error. '!'hose instructions did not
embody the elements of last clear ehance; they did not advise
the jury that if defendant could have avoided injuring
plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care after discovering
plaintiff's peril then plaintiff could recover. Certainly plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of liability presented to
the jury with respect to his ease regardless of tlw erosscomplaint. Daniels v. City&; County of San Francisco, sttpra,
40 Cal.2d 614, and Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, sttpra,
40 Cal.2d 630, contrary to the majority opinion, are clearly
applicable and show that the instructions given did not cure
the error in refusing the last elear chance instruction. In
the Daniels case it is said: "Defendants submit that even
though the court erroneously refused to instruct on the last
clear chance doctrine, nevertheless no prejudice resulted to
plaintiffs because ( 1) the doctr·ine was covered by other instructions given by the court and (2) the
verdict of
the jnry imports findings ·in favor of defendants on all material
issues so as to preclude plaintiffs from raising an objection
based on tl!at theory of 1·ecovrry. Neither point is well
taken.
"The instructions cited by defendants in nowise purported
to include the elements of the last clear chance doctrine.
Hather they vvere directed only to the duty of the bus driver
to 'use reasonable prudence in analyzing the . . . situation'
confronting him so as to avoid colliding with plaintiffs' automobile. Moreover, the court in its other instructions plainly
refuted any application of the last clear chance doctrine by
e.harging the jury that any negligence on the part of either
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Mrs. Daniels or her guest, Mrs. Smith, would bar a recovery,
a necessar~' tenet of the doctrine is the presence of
the plaintiff's negligence. l Citations.] It is the duty of the
court to instruct on every theory of the case firiding support
in the evidence." (Emphasis added.) In the Sills case, it
is said : ''Defendants finally contend that even though it was
for the trial court to have refused the requested
instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, such refusal
was not prejudicial error. In support of their position, defendants urge that every major 0lement of that doctrine was
other instructions. Two of the cited instructions
covered
concerned proximate cause, one being the usual definition
thereof and the other referring to a 'violation of law' as 'of
no consequence unless it was a proximate cause' of the inThe third cited instruction was a lengthy declaration of the law relating to the right-of-way at an intersection,
and the duty to exercise ordinary care so as to avoid a collision. Manif0stly, such instructions did not purport to deal
with the last clear chance doctrine and cannot be deemed
adequate for submitting to the jury the question of defendants' liability upon that theory. Moreover, at defendants'
request the jury was expressly charged, without qualification, that contributory negligence would bar a recovery, and
no declaration was made covering plaintiff's theory of his
right to prevail under the last clear chance doctrine. [ Citation.] In these circumstances defendants unavailingly argue
the proposition that the erroneously refused instruction should
not be deemed prejudicial because the principle therein stated
~was fully and fairly covered in other instructions to the jury.''
(Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra, 40 Cal.2d 630, 639.)
The majority opinion holds, in effect, that any time the defendant filE's a cross-complaint plaintiff is not entitled to a
last clear chance instruction although the facts justify it.
No authority is cited for that proposition and I believe there
is none. There is no basis for it.
T wonJd, th0refore, affirm the orders granting a new trial.
HE>spolldents' petition for a rE'hE'aring' "·as denie<l Mareh
Carter, .T., was of the opillion that the p0tition
should be granted.
;!,2, ]!););).

